The Obama administration is engaged in a broad push to make more home loans available to people with weaker credit, an effort that officials say will help power the economic recovery but that skeptics say could open the door to the risky lending that caused the housing crash in the first place.
COMPLET LIRE: WP
Avril 9, 2013 à 9:08 à la
So if the insurance business isn’t about making money on writing policies (predicated on sound actuarial work), and if an insurance company can even lose money on underwriting as many often do, and still make a profit by investing “the float”, then there may be an incentive to write policies, that reflect less than prudent risk management – that is to say losses on the underwriting side of the business would be made up on the investment side. As long as this is successful, shares in these companies can be sold to investors. The best investors are large funds like mutual funds because they buy in large junks of shares, are run by investment managers who are generally not very shrewd, and they hold long enough for insiders to sell. Large mutual funds are also the ideal investors because they have a steady stream of cash from IRA’s and 401k’s. IRA’s and 401k’s are steady sources of cash to mutual funds because most of those folks who were wise enough to envision saving, were also determined to buy and own a home (rather than rent one), thinking (perhaps wrongly), that it represented a sound investment. In this way, the loop from policy purchaser, to indirect title insurance company shareholder is complete. It’s almost like a double tax on the unsuspecting home purchaser, which is subtle and goes almost entirely undetected. That’s is why most homeowners have no clue who their title insurance company is, but can tell you in half a second who insures their car, their health care, or their home.
So what sort of investments are the investment managers at insurance companies making? Bien, we know the insurance culture isn’t fond of extreme sports, and as it turns out they’re not very enterprising when it comes to their investments either – let’s just say they’re passive, they like fixed income, vous savez, a few muni’s, maybe some treasuries, but above all, they like commercial bonds for their fixed income (and perceived safety), especially those which are derived from Residential Mortgage Backed Securities, (RMBS’s). The feeders of these funds – the mortgage origination and securitization industry, is none other than their very own customers – think of it as one big happy love triangle, or if you happen to live in Utah and prefer their par lance “plural marriage”. The title insurance companies, the mortgage origination and securitization industry and policy purchasers are like sister wives. Of course the husbands in these relationships of Asymmetrical Power are the alchemists of the modern era, they are the engineers of derivatives, and they hide behind curtains in tall shiny buildings in an emerald city called Wall Street, turning their Copper into Gold. For more on this activity, it might be worth reading the article
Avril 10, 2013 à 8:34 à la
The Nerve of the rats having comments
Are we still trying to blame the home owners, for there cynical plan that worked, come on American people open your eyes and wake up!
“The bubble was created by allowing bidding wars on real-estate, which i am sure they knew also!
if you put buyers in a buying frenzy as if it was an auction with no ceiling buyers will make astronomical offers higher and higher until they drive the market to almost to no return, you can see this happening at car auction, trying to outbid one another to sustain a purchase. Ils savaient ce qui se passerait lorsque vous détendre les conditions pour bénéficier d'achat d'une maison, “c'est comme mettre des enfants dans un magasin de bonbons et de dire “ne pas manger tout des garçons et des filles bonbons”.
Comme si les banques ne savent pas la bulle allait éclater en 2 ans!
“Banque représentant de vend pas”
“Nous pouvons faire le prêt, mais votre crédit n'est pas si grande, “mais ce que nous pouvons vous offrir un prêt teaser!
il est structuré comme, 2 taux fixe ans entre 3%-5% et après 2 années, il sera s'adapter à un taux variable à partir de 6.5% et chapeau à 11%.
Nous comprenons le réglage sera assez difficile à maintenir, mais ne vous inquiétez pas sur le taux variable parce que vous pouvez revenir et refinancer.
Lorsque l' 2 ans est en hausse, revenir à nous, valeur de votre propriété sera apprécié en raison du marché du logement est en croissance très rapide, and you can lock in a 30 year fix with no money down.
So now all THE loan originators, who were producing this BAD PRODUCT, now have an negotiable instrument that they know is toxic, but don’t care, parce que l' “REMARQUE” est négociable, ils regroupés des milliers de prêts, et les ont vendus à plus offrant pas à la valeur du prix d'achat, mais la valeur amorti, (exemple) disons que votre achat a été $100,000 après amortissement pour 2 ans et après un réglage hors de contrôle le montant final serait astronomique, si payé jusqu'à la fin de tous les paiements, la valeur amortie serait entre $600,00 et jusqu'à. Donc, si ils ont vendu le prêt pour $200,000 aux investisseurs $$$$$$$$$$$$ ils gagnent à la loterie pour tout un $100,000.
Et qui ont acheté ces prêts wall street, ils internés les sécularisé pour le marché des métiers et ils ne les achètent, ils ont été remboursés pour en faire des titres, ne peut pas être un “REMARQUE” et SECURITE” à la fois. Contre la loi!
greedy wall street made your mortgage a security and sold them as securities and made a lot of money, “BILLIONS” and they had a 2 year window to get this done, before the “BUBBLE BUSTED” and all those toxic loans they created failed, because when home owners went back in that next 2 years there was no value, and the banks where on hold because the mortgage market had “CRASHED”.
“SO WHEN WALL STREET SOLD ALL THOSE LOANS WHO GOT ALL THAT MULA!
WAS NOT ONE HOME OWNER, “But they got Blamed”.
“Played on the home owners win fall!